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SUMMARY
For a century, oil and gas wells have been Alberta’s economic pride. That there 
could be a hidden cost in maintaining these wells past their productive life is 
difficult to imagine, much less accept. The financial burden of abandoning a 
well officially is no doubt why Alberta producers delay doing so as long as 
possible. Turning a blind eye, they routinely keep non-producing wells in a state 
of “inactive” suspension and refuse to rule out the possibility that someday oil 
prices or technology, or both, will change significantly enough to make those 
wells profitable again. In most cases that will never happen, but the province 
plays along anyway: It enforces no limit on how long a well can be kept inactive 
before it must be reactivated or abandoned. While a convenience for well owners, 
there is no benefit to Albertans. They are exposed to the risk of thousands of 
inactive wells becoming a hazardous threat to public safety.
The longer a well is inactive, the higher the likelihood that its owner may no 
longer be around to arrange and pay for its official abandonment, a process 
whereby wells are permanently sealed using regulated methods that insure they 
cause no environmental damage. Oil and gas producers come and go. Periodic 
price shocks, like the one that recently ravaged the sector, drive companies into 
insolvency. When the owner of an inactive well is no longer around to pay for its 
abandonment costs, the well becomes orphaned. Alberta’s permissive policies 
have led to a situation where there are now more than 80,000 inactive wells 
in the province. Some have been inactive for decades. If the possibility existed 
that they could eventually become economical, those wells might be considered 
a blessing. However, the simulations that model scenarios where prices are 
substantially higher or where production technology is significantly improved, 
clearly show that the vast majority of these wells will never be reactivated, no 
matter how dramatically conditions improve.
If oil prices rise 200 per cent, the modeling shows that just 12 per cent of oil 
wells become reactivated, and just seven per cent of gas wells. When the model 
tests to see what happens when a technological innovation improves so that 
the remaining oil or gas in a well that cannot be recovered is suddenly made 
recoverable (i.e., a 514 per cent increase in oil reserves), just 10 per cent of 
inactive oil wells are reactivated, and just six per cent of gas wells. The most effective 
way to reduce the number of inactive wells, the model finds, is by reducing the cost of 
their abandonment. With a 25 per cent reduction in abandonment costs, the pool of 
inactive wells shrinks by 20 per cent for both oil and gas, while the number of abandoned 
wells increases by nearly 50 per cent for both oil and gas. In all cases, the amount of oil 
and gas production that would change one way or the other — either by a minimal level 
of reactivation or a significant wave of abandonment — is marginal and not of meaningful 
benefit to Albertans.
Creating an industry fund that takes responsibility for a well that has been orphaned has 
been Alberta’s approach to managing all its orphan wells. The deemed liability of 80,000 
inactive wells is so large presently that the fund would be insufficient to cover the costs. 
The only way to prevent the province’s vast and growing number of inactive wells from 
remaining an ongoing risk to the public is by limiting the ability of owners to keep wells 
inactive as long as they like. Policies should recognize that most inactive wells will likely 
never produce oil or gas again.
1INTRODUCTION 
Recent news reports have raised alarm over the growing number of orphan oil and gas wells 
in Alberta and the Alberta Energy Regulator (AER) has recently put into place rules that it 
hopes will stem the rising number of orphan wells.1, 2 
An orphan well is a well without a legally responsible party to pay for its final closure. 
The media have pointed to the sharp increase in the number of orphan wells as a cause for 
concern; in the last 24 months, the number of orphan wells awaiting cleanup has increased 
from 162 to 768.3 However, this number is small when compared to the number of inactive 
wells in Alberta.4 Inactive wells are wells that have not had any volumetric activity in a 
year or more but have not yet been permanently closed; these inactive wells, unlike orphan 
wells, still have a financially viable owner who is expected to pay for the final closure. As 
of Nov. 26, 2016, there were 81,602 reported inactive wells in Alberta.5 
On one hand, these inactive wells could be a blessing if they are ever reactivated and 
brought back into production. On the other hand, given that they have not yet been 
permanently closed, they run the risk of imposing environmental costs or eventually 
becoming orphaned. Current policies in Alberta implicitly treat inactive wells as though 
they have future production potential by allowing operators to indefinitely suspend 
operations. If this assumption is wrong, and the inactive wells will not be reactivated in the 
future, these policies are masking a large potential accumulation of liability, as operators 
may claim bankruptcy and leave the wells orphaned. This briefing paper reports on the 
results of a previous paper that tries to disentangle whether “temporary” well suspensions 
in Alberta are effectively permanent.6 While this does not speak to how many of the 
inactive wells will become orphaned, it is nonetheless informative with regards to future 
liability. Inactive wells that are not going to be reactivated are a liability, whether to their 
responsible party or to the Orphan Well Association.
Regulations in Alberta require that when the end of an oil or gas well’s productive life has 
been reached, it must be “plugged and abandoned,” which requires removing equipment and 
sealing groundwater formations with cement. The entire wellsite must also be “reclaimed,” 
in other words the surrounding land is revegetated (or brought to a “new use” state). 
1 Kelly Cryderman, “‘Orphan’ wells left behind in oil slump,” The Globe and Mail, March 18, 2016; Darcy Henton, “Alberta 
Says Industry Responsible for Reclaiming Oil Wells,” Calgary Herald, February 10, 2016; Terry Reith and Briar Stewart, 
“Alberta faces growing backlog of abandoned oil and gas wells,” CBC News, July 14, 2015.
2 Recent new rules to reduce risk can be found at the Alberta Energy Regulator website, https://aer.ca/rules-and-regulations/
bulletins/bulletin-2016-16.
3 See the 2015/2016 annual report and 2013/2014 annual report of the Orphan Well Association at orphanwell.ca. Similarly, 
2012 was a year noted for having a “large increase in the number of new orphan wells”; 50 new wells were added to the 
inventory of 14 orphan wells (Orphan Well Association’s 2012/13 Annual Report).
4 Alberta’s orphan-well count is also small when compared to the number of orphaned wells in the U.S. An estimated 149,371 
orphaned wells are awaiting abandonment. See: Interstate Oil and Gas Compact Commission, “Protecting Our Country’s 
Resources: The States’ Case” (2008); and Jacqueline Ho et al., “Plugging the Gaps in Inactive Well Policy: Final Report,” 
Resources for the Future Report (2016). 
5 AER Inactive Well Licence List available at: https://www.aer.ca/rules-and-regulations/directives/directive-013.
6 Lucija Muehlenbachs, “A Dynamic Model of Cleanup: Estimating Sunk Costs in Oil And Gas Production,” International 
Economic Review 56, 1 (2015): 155-185.
2Plugging, abandoning, and reclaiming a wellsite can be an expensive endeavour, ranging in 
cost from $50,000 to several million dollars.7 However, a well that has stopped producing 
need not be immediately plugged, abandoned, and reclaimed; it is possible to “suspend” 
production.8 Current policies in Alberta do not put a time limit on how long a well can be 
suspended, allowing wells to be in a suspended state for an indefinite amount of time.9 This 
is how we have 80,000 wells that have stopped production but have not been permanently 
cleaned up. Some of these wells have not produced for 60 years, yet according to the AER, 
their closure is only temporary.
There are requirements that a well owner must comply with in order to suspend a well. 
These measures reduce the risk to the environment and the public, but also allow for easier 
well reactivation, so that the productive life of the well is not cut unnecessarily short. 
Indeed, the AER views suspended wells as wells that are “not currently considered to be 
economically viable but could become so in the future.”10 However, in order to ensure the 
possibility that wells can be reactivated, regulators introduce the risk that these wells will 
become orphaned. Without requiring wells to be permanently closed, it is possible that a 
well with no hope of reactivation could be left suspended indefinitely. The true expectations 
of the well operators are unobserved by regulators and therefore it is difficult for regulators 
to know to what extent temporary closures are being used in lieu of permanent closures. 
I describe here the results of a previous paper on the likelihood that inactive wells in 
Alberta will be reactivated.11 The paper is the first attempt in the economics literature to 
decipher the true motivations behind well suspensions. This question can be addressed 
with a statistical method that uses historical decisions to estimate parameters of the model 
(such as the cost to permanently close a well or the cost to reactivate one), which can 
then be used in a model to predict future decisions (whether to reactive an inactive well). 
The model attempts to evaluate whether the inactive wells are still assets by simulating 
a hypothetical ideal scenario — for example, of high prices and improved technology — 
to see how many of these inactive wells would be reactivated. The paper finds that only 
with a drastic, arguably implausible increase in prices and recovery rates will there be a 
significant increase in the number of reactivated oil and gas wells. This implies that wells 
are typically left suspended not because of the option to reactivate, but rather to avoid costly 
environmental obligations, coupled with the fact that there is no penalty for leaving wells 
suspended indefinitely. Thus, the regulatory requirement (or lack thereof) is introducing a 
high risk of potential future liability for both the industry and taxpayers as most of these 
suspended wells are not assets and the longer they are suspended, the longer the operator 
7 This is a range of costs taken from the popular press and an annual report from Alberta’s Orphan Well Association. I am 
not aware of any dataset on the costs paid for cleaning up non-orphan wells, therefore this is a range, and not indicative of 
the average cost. See: Cryderman, “‘Orphan’”; and Orphan Well Association, 2007/08 Annual Report (Alberta Oil and Gas 
Orphan Abandonment and Reclamation Association, 2008). In the U.S. the costs are much lower. Expenditures on orphan 
wells range from US$474 to US$575,945. See: Ho et al., “Plugging.”
8 Alberta Energy Regulator, “Directive 013: Suspension Requirements for Wells,” February 2016. In other jurisdictions, this 
state of operation is termed “temporarily abandoned.”
9 ibid.; Alberta Agriculture and Forestry, “The Inactive Well Compliance Program,” http://www1.agric.gov.
ab.ca/$Department/deptdocs.nsf/all/ofa16066.
10 Alberta Energy Regulator website, “How are Wells Suspended,” https://www.aer.ca/abandonment-and-reclamation/how-
are-wells-suspended.
11 Muehlenbachs, “A Dynamic.”
3is exposed to economic fluctuations that could drive it into bankruptcy, leaving these 
unproductive suspended wells orphaned.
Provided that there is proper environmental management and monitoring, indefinite 
suspension could be a well-guided policy if the wells that are eventually reactivated end up 
producing large quantities of oil and gas. However, the estimation predicts that the quantity 
of oil and gas supplied from the wells that are reactivated is very small. These findings 
have far-reaching implications for the oil and gas industry. Assuming that permanent well 
abandonment poses a lower environmental risk than indefinite suspension, and that the land 
can be used for other productive purposes, if companies are not taking into account the 
costs of plugging, abandonment, and reclamation, the development of oil and gas reserves is 
at a rate above what is socially optimal and subsequent market prices are consequently too 
low. The policy implication would be to call for stronger mechanisms to ensure companies 
do not use temporary closure in lieu of permanent closure. The paper summarized here 
demonstrates that policies for plugging and abandoning oil and gas wells in Alberta are 
biased towards inexpensive potential restart rather than environmental protection or 
remediation. 
POLICY IN ALBERTA 
When a well stops producing, some jurisdictions will allow the well to remain in a 
temporarily abandoned state so that it need not be immediately plugged, abandoned, 
and reclaimed. The requirements needed to obtain temporary abandonment vary across 
jurisdictions, from no requirements at all to needing to cap and plug the wells and perform 
well-integrity tests.12 In Alberta, if a well has not produced in six to 12 months, depending 
on type, then operators must follow specific requirements to temporarily abandon the well, 
or what Alberta terms “suspend” (a process that is one step from plug and abandon).13 In 
the requirements necessary for temporary abandonment, Alberta is on the stringent end of 
this spectrum, requiring pressure tests every one to five years depending on risk-level, and 
requiring medium-risk wells to be plugged.14 
With regards to the length of time a well may remain suspended, Alberta is one of the 
more lenient jurisdictions as it has no limit set on the length of time a well can remain 
suspended.15 Alberta’s regulator has the authority to order a wellsite to be plugged and 
abandoned if the suspended well is not in compliance with regulation; however, this is not a 
common occurrence and such an order is often rescinded or amended. For example, in 2007 
there were only six well-abandonment orders and in 2006 there were 19 well-abandonment 
orders, but as of June 2009 only two of these wells had been abandoned.16 Therefore, 
although it is required under the Environmental Protection and Enhancement Act, s. 137, 
12 Ho et al., “Plugging.”
13 AER, “Directive 013.” 
14 ibid.
15 
In the U.S., the time limit on suspension ranges from six to 300 months. Many states provide extensions that allow wells to 
remain temporarily abandoned for a longer time period. In about two-thirds of these states there is no limit to the number or 
duration of extensions. See: Ho et al., “Plugging.”
16 Alberta Energy Regulator, “Abandonment and Closure Orders,” June 2013.
4that all wells in Alberta eventually be abandoned and reclaimed, it is effectively up to the 
operator to decide on the time frame. 
One issue with allowing for indefinite suspension of inactive wells is that inactive wells 
are more likely to become orphaned. If, instead of reclaiming a well, an operator leaves it 
suspended, unpredictable swings in the price of oil like those we have experienced in recent 
years can drive many once-productive operators into bankruptcy. Productive wells are more 
likely to be sold, with the proceeds collected by creditors, and inactive wells are more likely 
to be orphaned. The longer the well is suspended, the more likely it will encounter a low oil 
price. 
This problem has been magnified by the Alberta Court of Appeal’s recent Redwater 
decision, where it ruled that creditors of a bankrupt operator have first rights on proceeds 
from the sale of the operator’s wells.17 Those proceeds are not required to go towards 
reclamation of the bankrupt debtor’s inactive wells. This has the potential to leave even 
more wells orphaned than before.
In Alberta, orphan wells are managed by the Orphan Well Association (OWA), a not-for-
profit association that receives money from the industry through the orphan fund levy. The 
orphan fund levy is administered and managed by the AER. Due to the increasing problem 
of orphan wells, in 2016/17 the AER increased this levy from $15 million to $30 million 
annually. However, this fund is inadequate to cover the growing problem of orphan wells. 
Even if industry kept up this yearly rate of spending, it would take approximately 177 years 
to pay for deemed liabilities now totalling $36 billion.18 
Typically, jurisdictions require companies to post financial bonds as an assurance so the 
company is liable for part of the abandonment and reclamation costs should it become 
insolvent. The bond amounts also vary, with many jurisdictions offering blanket bonds, 
in which a fixed bond amount is charged for all of the company’s wells.19 Alberta has an 
atypical system: a financial bond is only required if a company’s liabilities are greater than 
its assets. Assets are calculated from the quantity of oil and gas produced and liabilities 
are calculated from the counts of wells of different types.20 The assets-to-liabilities ratio 
is recalculated for a producer every month. Therefore, it is possible for companies to drill 
wells without posting any financial assurance bonds as long as the company’s current 
production is high enough to maintain an assets-to-liabilities ratio greater than one. 
With bonds set lower than the actual cost of reclamation, leaving a well in a temporarily 
suspended state is much less expensive than plugging, abandoning and reclaiming it.21 Final 
17 Redwater Energy Corporation v. Grant Thornton Limited and Alberta Energy Regulator (2016), ABQB 278 (Court of 
Queen’s Bench of Alberta, 2016).
18 Hélène M.E. de Beer, “Alberta’s end-of-life oil and gas liabilities” (thesis, University of Calgary School of Public Policy), 
http://prism.ucalgary.ca/bitstream/1880/51698/1/de%20Beer,%20Helena%20Maria%20Elisabeth.pdf.
19 Ho et al., “Plugging.”
20 Alberta Energy Regulator, “Directive 006: Licensee Liability Rating (LLR) Program and Licence Transfer Process,” 
February 2016.
21 
For example, the annual payment for a wellsite is based on “loss of use” and “adverse effects” only (not on the land value 
or the entry fee, which is paid one time in the first year). Compensation must be paid until the mineral-rights owner has 
received a reclamation certificate. The annual payments range between $167 and $600 per acre for loss of land use and from 
$117 to $2,500 per acre for general disturbance (Alberta Agricultural and Rural Development, “Compensation For Surface 
Leases,” 2010.)
5cleanup is so costly because of the remediation of existing environmental damages and the 
implementation of measures to prevent ongoing or future damages. Therefore, by having 
the option to suspend a well, companies do not have strong incentives to internalize either 
the environmental risks or future potential liabilities they impose on industry should they 
go bankrupt.
This type of system works well during an oil boom but not so well during an oil bust, 
precisely the time when a financial bond is needed. The industry has stressed that should 
any wells become orphaned, the industry as a whole will cover the cleanup costs through 
the orphan levy fund.22 However, even this arrangement is only sustainable as long as 
the proportion that each company pays is small. During an oil bust, more companies 
declare bankruptcy, resulting in more orphan wells and fewer companies to split the costs. 
However, increasing bonding requirements will likely lead to sharp resistance, particularly 
from small operators with capital constraints.23
MODELLING OPERATORS’ DECISIONS
Investments that involve sunk (irreversible, unrecoverable) costs, such as the cost to 
plug, abandon, and reclaim a well, require special attention when being modelled. For 
example, if there is a chance that a non-producing well will be reactivated in the future, 
then there is value in temporarily suspending the well and postponing the investment to 
permanently close it. There is also value in having the option to wait until the well becomes 
economically viable again and this value must be incorporated into the decision for the 
well’s operating state. Furthermore, because there is a sunk cost to reactivate a suspended 
well, even if the forces that were originally behind the suspension are reversed, the well 
might still not be reactivated. Making matters more complicated is the uncertainty in 
future oil and gas prices as well as the unknown prospect of future production with future 
technologies. This makes the estimate of future streams of profits uncertain. All of these 
features make the decision for the operating state of a well perfect for modelling in a real-
options framework. 
Real-options models extend the theory of financial options and apply it to real investments 
such as building a factory or drilling a well. These models incorporate the fact that there 
is value in being able to exercise options (e.g., there is value from waiting until next year 
to decide what to do with a well, in case prices increase). And as one might expect, as 
the value of the option to postpone decisions increases, the more uncertainty there is. 
For instance, the less one knows about oil prices next year, the more valuable it is to 
delay plugging and abandonment. Therefore, one can model the decision of what to do 
with an active well (keep producing, temporarily suspend, or permanently close) as well 
as the decision for what to do with a suspended well (keep it suspended, reactivate, or 
permanently close). The decision can be modelled such that it includes the payoff from each 
choice as well as the value of all of the available options. Thus, decisions today depend on 
22 See Alberta Energy Regulator, “Bulletin 2016-05: First 2016/17 Orphan Fund Levy,” March 2016. Each company will pay 
a portion of the Orphan Well Association’s budget, depending on how much of the industry’s future deemed liabilities are 
attributed to it. 
23 These concerns are voiced in: Jesse Snyder, “Alberta’s New Abandoned-Well Program Makes Compliance Impossible for 
Some,” Alberta Oil, October 27, 2015. 
6all future potential costs as a result of today’s decision, such as the cost to reactivate a well, 
the operations and maintenance costs of a suspended well, the lifting cost per barrel of 
oil, as well as some estimate of risk. These costs are typically not known to researchers or 
regulators and therefore these must be estimated. 
The real-options model used here includes the following features: The operating state 
is dynamic and can be changed now, or at some later date; there are unrecoverable sunk 
costs to changing operating states; and future prices and recovery are uncertain. The 
operator will choose the option that maximizes the discounted stream of future profits. 
Each choice and future value depends on the current state of nature (the age of the well, 
the wellhead price of oil or gas, the per-well remaining reserves, and the current operating 
state). The choice made affects the current operating state (active, inactive, or plugged) 
and the remaining reserves per well. The model assumes that the producer maximizes 
lifetime profits only by choosing the operating state, but not through how much to extract.24 
If the producer decides to extract, the per-period quantity recovered is a random draw 
from a distribution that depends on the remaining per-well reserves, the age of the well, 
and estimated parameters governing the probability of future production. The quantity of 
future production is uncertain; however, with data on past production, a distribution of the 
probability of future production can be calculated. This probability distribution depends on 
the estimate of the quantity of oil that is in the ground, which is publicly available for oil 
and gas pools in Alberta. Therefore, the paper calculates the expected production and the 
expected price of oil in the future using past well production, quantity of reserves in place, 
and price movements. 
Using an estimation method specifically developed for decisions such as these (irreversible, 
uncertain, and repeated over time), the parameters of the model (i.e., the costs and operator 
beliefs about future prices) can be estimated using historical data.25 The estimation strategy 
intuitively works as follows: The first step is to estimate the operator’s subjective beliefs for 
how the state variables progress over time. For example, what is the probability distribution 
of next period’s oil price, or next period’s remaining reserves. The second step takes these 
beliefs as given and estimates the cost parameters that result in the highest likelihood of 
replicating the historical decisions. Once the parameters are estimated, then one has a 
model of the optimal decision given any state of nature. With a fully estimated model, 
hypothetical scenarios that we have not seen in the past can be examined. 
DESCRIPTION OF THE DATA
To run this model, a dataset at the well level was created in order to observe the decisions 
of operators per well over time. To do this, five datasets of the Alberta oil and gas industry 
were combined. The first dataset is a record of historical production from the universe 
of oil and gas wells in Alberta and was obtained through IHS Inc., which distributes the 
records collected by the Alberta Energy Regulator. This dataset contains monthly oil and 
24 
The assumption rests on the assertion that extraction is mainly driven by reserve size and geologic factors, which producers 
do not have full control over.
25 John Rust, “Optimal Replacement of GMC Bus Engines: An Empirical Model of Harold Zurcher,” Econometrica (1987): 
999-1033.
7gas production information dating back to 1924, with complete records starting after 1961. 
The data include variables on a well’s location (latitude and longitude, as well as the name 
of the field and pool it is on), depth, licence date, spud date (the day the drill hit the ground), 
on-production date, and the names of the current and original operators.26
The second dataset is a historical record of official reserve estimates of all non-confidential 
pools in Alberta from both the Alberta Energy Regulator and the National Energy Board of 
Canada.27 The dataset spans 2000 to 2007 and contains 67,142 oil and gas pools, although 
not all pools are observed in every year. This dataset contains: (1) initial oil or gas in place; 
(2) recovery factor, which is the fraction of the oil or gas in place that can be extracted 
“under current technology and present and anticipated economic conditions”; (3) initial 
established reserves, equal to the initial oil or gas in place multiplied by the recovery factor; 
and (4) remaining established reserves, equal to the initial established reserves minus 
the cumulative production and surface loss.28 The data also include characteristics of the 
pools and hydrocarbons in those pools, such as porosity, initial pressure, area, density, 
temperature, and water saturation. Each pool can be matched to a well. These data are key 
to the estimation of production potential because they provide insights into each well’s 
current productivity as well as a way to estimate production uncertainty in the future (i.e., 
how changes in oil and gas prices will impact recovery rates over time). 
The third dataset, from the Alberta Energy Regulator, identifies wells that were plugged 
and abandoned, along with the date of plugging, and the wells that received a reclamation 
certificate or wells that were deemed reclamation-exempt by Alberta’s Environment 
ministry. A longitudinal dataset is thus created where each well is classified as active, 
inactive, or plugged for each year from when it was drilled until 2007. A well is classified as 
active if it produced any volume of oil or gas within that year; it is classified as suspended 
if it did not produce oil or gas in 12 months or more; and it is classified as abandoned if it 
appeared in the dataset of abandoned wells.
The fourth dataset, from the Petroleum Services Association of Canada (PSAC), consists of 
geographic information system (GIS) shape files that designate areas that have similar costs 
in production and drilling. The PSAC boundaries and well locations were entered into GIS 
to assign a PSAC area to each well. 
The final dataset is the average wellhead price of crude oil and natural gas in Alberta, 
obtained from the Canadian Association of Petroleum Producers’ Statistical Handbook for 
Canada’s Upstream Petroleum Industry.29 
Taking the full dataset of the universe of wells in Alberta, some wells are omitted that do 
not fit into the model created. First, coalbed methane, heavy oil, injection, and water wells 
are excluded, leaving 350,457 wells in the production dataset. Second, since the model 
shows that the decision to plug and abandon, stop production, or reactivate a well depends 
26 
An oilfield is the geographical area where a well is drilled. A field can have multiple pools, but each pool is a distinct 
reservoir that is confined within impermeable rock or water.
27 
All pools eventually lose their confidential status (usually after one year), so this dataset contains nearly all pools in 
Alberta.
28 Alberta Energy Regulator, “Alberta’s Energy Reserves 2007 and Supply/Demand Outlook 2008-2017,” 2008.
29 Canadian Association of Petroleum Producers, “Statistical Handbook for Canada’s Upstream Petroleum Industry,” 2009.
8on the remaining oil and gas reserves, the full sample is restricted to only those wells that 
have a reserve estimate. Of the 350,457 wells, 105,207 are in a pool that is listed in the 
reserves dataset. 
The result of this second restriction is that the analysis corresponds to wells that are, or 
once were, deemed producible (not “dry holes”). Wells that are drilled but do not tap into 
an oil or gas pool are more likely to be decommissioned without being completed and 
they will also not show up in the subsample. More than 45 per cent of the wells that are 
decommissioned in Alberta are decommissioned immediately after being drilled. The 
results from an estimation using the subsample cannot be generalized to all wells in the full 
sample, but they could be generalized to wells in the full sample that at one time produced. 
Whether to complete a well for production is a separate decision from whether to produce 
from an already completed well. And indeed, it is more challenging to determine the 
future of wells that have, or once had, a potential for production, as opposed to those that 
definitely cannot produce.
Thirdly, the subsample is further reduced by deleting any wells that traverse both oil and 
gas pools, leaving 94,009 wells in the working subsample. This significantly reduces the 
computational complexity, because modelling the choice to produce oil or gas is avoided 
without losing much insight into the choice of operating state. 
Lastly, wells are then divided into different types depending on: (1) whether the well is 
an oil or gas well; (2) whether the well is in a single-well pool or a multi-well pool; (3) 
the applicable royalty regime; and (4) its PSAC area. Then, within these groups, wells 
are further divided by (5) clusters based on time invariant characteristics (depth, initial 
pressure, density, water saturation, and temperature). 
RESULTS 
In order to confirm that the model is capable of making counterfactual predictions, the first 
check is to see if the model output can identify historical decisions. If so, the model can 
be adjusted to examine questions in the form of “how many wells would be reactivated 
if…?” The first thought experiment examined simulates the industry under some different 
scenarios that operators claim would prompt them to reactivate after they choose to suspend 
well operations: high prices, improved recovery rates, and reduced reactivation costs. 
Similarly, two additional scenarios of potential policy options are explored: reducing the 
costs to plug and abandon wells or increasing the costs of leaving a well suspended. The 
length of all these scenarios is set at 12 years and the outcomes after 12 years are compared 
to a business-as-usual, baseline scenario. 
In the first scenario, each well type faces the costs estimated for its type, but each now 
receives a constant “high price” (of $197.72 per barrel for oil and $462.44 per thousand 
cubic metres for gas).30 The results are summarized in Table 1 below. For oil reserves, the 
growth of reserves does not compensate for the increased production, so there are 24 per 
cent fewer oil reserves than in the baseline case. Comparatively, for gas reserves, the high 
30 These were chosen using the U.S. Energy Information Administration’s Annual Energy Outlook of 2009, using the “high 
price” case in 2030 for oil, and 1.5 times the “high price” case for gas. 
9price results in more reserve growth showing that the expected returns from investments 
in exploration or enhanced recovery are greater for gas than for oil. It is fascinating that, 
despite the active wells being more productive, the increased reserves and higher prices are 
not sufficient to induce many inactive wells to be reactivated. This is particularly striking 
in the case of gas wells where, with 78 per cent increased productivity and 120 per cent 
increased remaining reserves, there are only seven per cent fewer inactive wells than in the 
baseline case.
TABLE 1 HIGH PRICES
Price at End  
of 12 years 
Increase in 
Remaining Reserves 
Increase in  
Annual Production 
Number of  
Active Wells 
Number of  
Inactive Wells 
Number of 
Abandoned Wells
Oil 320% -24% 21% (21% cumulative) 19% -12% -7%
Gas 200% 120% 78% (31% cumu-
lative)
6% -7% -3%
Note: Values represent the per cent difference between the counterfactual scenarios and the baseline scenario. 
In a second scenario, a hypothetical technology change allows for all the oil or gas in place 
to be recovered. To date, according to the data, recovery rates range from 15 to 95 per cent 
for gas, with an average of 67 per cent, and from .01 to 90 per cent for oil, with an average 
of 12 per cent. In the hypothetical scenario, recovery rates are simulated to be 100 per cent 
of the oil and gas that is in place. The results are summarized in Table 2 below. For both oil 
and gas, the number of active wells increase with increase in recovery rates. However, this 
significant increase does not induce the reactivation of many inactive gas wells. A higher 
recovery rate alone has less of an effect on increasing the number of producing wells than a 
higher price of oil or gas, which not only improves profits, but also increases reserve growth.
TABLE 2 TECHNOLOGY CHANGE INCREASES RECOVERY RATE TO 100 PER CENT
Increase in  
Remaining Reserves 
Increase in  
Annual Production 
Number of  
Active Wells 
Number of  
Inactive Wells
Number of  
Abandoned Wells
Oil 514% 411% (164% cumulative) 17% -10% -7%
Gas 418% 387% (275% cumulative) 7% -6% -6%
Note: Values represent the per cent difference between the counterfactual scenarios and the baseline scenario. 
However, technology might not only improve recovery factors, but might also decrease 
the cost to reactivate a well. Therefore, the third scenario simulates the reactivation costs 
for all well groups dropping by 25 per cent. The results are summarized in Table 3 below. 
Interestingly, for gas, the additional production from active wells is only marginal: there 
is only 14 per cent more production in the last year of the simulation (seven per cent 
more cumulative production). The reactivated oil wells are slightly more productive than 
gas wells: after 12 years there are 19 per cent more active wells, and 20 per cent more 
production (only nine per cent more cumulative production than in the baseline case). 
Corresponding with the increased cumulative production, there are fewer remaining 
reserves at the end of the 12-year period (a reduction of 11 to 13 per cent). And in the 
case of gas wells, the production by the end of the 12 years is less than in the baseline 
case. However due to lack of data on reactivation costs, it is more difficult to assess the 
probability of a reduction in reactivation costs than it is to assess the probability of an 
increase in prices or recovery rates.
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TABLE 3 LOW REACTIVATION COSTS
Increase in  
Remaining Reserves
Increase in  
Annual Production
Number of  
Active Wells
Number of  
Inactive Wells
Number of  
Abandoned Wells
Oil -13% 20% (9% cumulative) 19% -7% -12%
Gas -11% 14% (7% cumulative) 9% -4% -10%
Note: Values represent the per cent difference between the counterfactual scenarios and the baseline scenario. 
It is also interesting to look how responsive the model is to changes in the cost of plugging, 
abandoning, and reclaiming the well. The fourth scenario simulates the 12-year forecast 
with plugging and reclamation costs being 25 per cent cheaper than in the baseline case 
and the results are reproduced in Table 4 below. The number of plugged wells is very 
elastic to plugging costs, as a 25 per cent reduction in cost results in 46 to 48 per cent 
more abandoned wells. Decreasing abandonment costs might be unappealing to a regulator 
because not only does the number of inactive wells decrease, but also, this scenario results 
in 20 per cent fewer active wells. However, production only decreases by two to five per 
cent, because these wells are not big producers. 
TABLE 4 LOW ABANDONMENT COSTS (25 PER CENT CHEAPER)
Increase in  
Remaining Reserves
Increase in  
Annual Production
Number of  
Active Wells
Number of  
Inactive Wells
Number of  
Abandoned Wells
Oil 14% -17% (-5% cumulative) -17% -20% 48%
Gas 10% 6% (-2% cumulative) -18% -20% 46%
Note: Values represent the per cent difference between the counterfactual scenarios and the baseline scenario. 
In contrast, a policy that increases the cost of suspending a well could increase the number 
of abandoned wells without decreasing the number of active wells. To examine how 
responsive the operating choice is to the cost of leaving a well inactive, the final scenario 
simulates a 12-year forecast of inactivity being 25 per cent more expensive per year. As 
long as the externalities associated with leaving a well inactive are accounted for, ad 
infinitum, then leaving a well inactive could be socially optimal. This simulation can be 
likened to a tax on inactive wells. Such a policy would be more appealing to a regulator 
that maximizes social welfare, which is a function of production, because under this 
scenario, the number of decommissioned wells increases (by three to five per cent) as does 
the number of active wells (by five to six per cent). As expected with the reactivation of 
wells, this scenario results in an increase in the cumulative oil and gas produced over the 
12-year period. However, the increase in cumulative production is less than the increase in 
reactivated wells (cumulative production only increases by two per cent), indicating that the 
average reactivated well is considerably less productive.
TABLE 5 HIGH SUSPENSION COSTS
Increase in  
Remaining Reserves
Increase in  
Annual Production
Number of  
Active Wells
Number of  
Inactive Wells
Number of  
Abandoned Wells
Oil -4% -5% (2% cumulative) 6% -9% 5%
Gas 3% 11% (2% cumulative) 5% -13% 3%
Note: Values represent the per cent difference between the counterfactual scenarios and the baseline scenario. 
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DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
The paper summarized in this briefing paper aims to determine the rationale for leaving 
oil and gas wells inactive. Inactive wells can either become an asset, if they eventually are 
reactivated and contribute to our energy supply, or they could become a liability if they 
are never reactivated, cause environmental degradation, and must undergo costly cleanup, 
sometimes at another’s expense. These results indicate that inactive wells are indeed a 
liability, as their future potential as productive resources is limited. 
The model finds that the cost of abandonment plays an important part in determining the 
number of abandoned wells, however a policy to decrease the cost of abandoning a well 
would result in not only fewer inactive wells, but also fewer active wells, making such a 
policy less appealing to a regulator that favours increased production. Conversely, a policy 
of increasing the cost of suspending a well would increase the number of active wells 
and decrease the number of inactive wells. However, the contribution to the oil and gas 
supply from the wells that are reactivated would be very small. This calls into question the 
rationale behind current policies that provide producers the option of deferring a suspended 
well’s reactivation indefinitely, accumulating liability. 
If optimistic conditions are not enough to induce well reactivation, this implies that wells 
are left inactive not because of the option to reactivate, but rather the high sunk costs of 
abandonment. Should externalities result from suspended wells, then this behaviour may not 
be socially optimal. Whether this is optimal will depend on the cost of the environmental 
damages that suspended wells cause. Resources for the Future surveyed the literature on 
potential damages and found that while the pathways are clearly defined (they include 
mechanical integrity failure, failed well casings, and cement failure), there is little empirical 
literature quantifying that damage. For example, there are no studies measuring differences 
in the rate that methane leaks from suspended wells versus plugged and abandoned wells. 
This briefing paper has assumed that abandoning wells is a worthwhile endeavour, however, 
further research into the costs of the environmental damages is warranted.31
31 
Determining the costs of suspended wells is difficult but doable. The externalities associated with these wells depend on 
the well location, such as if the well intersects the range of the woodland caribou or is near any houses, for instance. For 
example, see: “Leaky Calmar well forces demolition of homes,” CBC News, December 6, 2010, http://www.cbc.ca/news/
canada/edmonton/leaky-calmar-well-forces-demolition-of-homes-1.939167. Litigation for groundwater contamination 
provides insights into the cost of groundwater contamination in the worst cases, however it is difficult to value the 
environmental costs from a given inactive well. See: “Calgary judge hears $33M lawsuit over natural gas drilling,” CBC 
News, January 18, 2013.
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